Dissatisfied, uninformed or both? Democratic satisfaction, political knowledge and the acceptance of clientelism in a new democracy by Gherghina, Sergiu et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fdem20
Democratization
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20
Dissatisfied, uninformed or both? Democratic
satisfaction, political knowledge and the
acceptance of clientelism in a new democracy
Sergiu Gherghina, Inga Saikkonen & Petar Bankov
To cite this article: Sergiu Gherghina, Inga Saikkonen & Petar Bankov (2021): Dissatisfied,
uninformed or both? Democratic satisfaction, political knowledge and the acceptance of clientelism
in a new democracy, Democratization, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2021.1947250
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1947250
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 07 Jul 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Dissatisfied, uninformed or both? Democratic
satisfaction, political knowledge and the acceptance of
clientelism in a new democracy
Sergiu Gherghina a, Inga Saikkonen b and Petar Bankov a
aDepartment of Politics and International Relations, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; bSocial
Science Research Institute, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland
ABSTRACT
In many countries, voters are targeted with clientelistic and programmatic electoral
offers. Existing research explores the demand side of clientelism, but we still know
very little about what determines voters’ acceptance of clientelistic and
programmatic electoral offers. This article builds a novel theoretical framework on
the role that democratic dissatisfaction and political knowledge play in shaping
voters’ acceptance of different types of electoral offers. We test the implications of
the theory with a survey experiment conducted after the 2019 local elections in
Bulgaria. Our results show that low-knowledge voters and those who are
dissatisfied with the performance of democracy and democratic institutions are
more likely to accept clientelistic offers from politicians. The findings contribute to
the literature on electoral clientelism and political attitudes.
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Introduction
Electoral clientelism, defined as the provision of particular material rewards in exchange
for electoral support,1 is widespread in contemporary societies. It has gradually become
an important component of many elections in new democracies and electoral author-
itarian regimes. In this context, we know much about the supply side of clientelism.
Extensive research explores why political actors use clientelism, how it works and devel-
ops over time, and what are its forms.2 There is somewhat less information about the
demand side of clientelism and how voters perceive clientelism. Previous studies
have investigated voters’ access to resources, ideological position, preferences for
brokers and perceptions of efficacy.3 So far, the demand side has been investigated
through the lenses of choices made by voters when exposed to clientelism. However,
we know very little about how willing voters are to accept clientelistic practices. Infor-
mation about these attitudes is relevant because it sheds light on society’s openness
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towards clientelism, reveals the anchor that clientelism may have in the political culture
and could help predicting the behaviour of political actors in the future.
This article addresses this gap in the literature and aims to explain why voters may
accept electoral clientelism and programmatic policy offers. To this end, we build a
theoretical framework that differentiates between positive clientelistic exchanges,
negative (coercive) clientelistic exchanges and programmatic inducement in terms
of their expected “returns” to the voter as well as the broader implications of the
exchange. Based on this theoretical framework, we formulate a series of testable
hypotheses about the effects of democratic satisfaction and political knowledge on
voter acceptance of electoral clientelism and programmatic politics. First, we expect
that voters’ acceptance of clientelistic targeting is shaped by their perceptions of
how well the political system and political institutions function. We expect that
highly dissatisfied voters are more susceptible to particularistic benefits offered by cli-
entelistic exchanges in contrast with the more uncertain benefits offered by program-
matic voting. Second, we expect that voters’ political knowledge and their
understanding of the implications of these various types of electoral exchanges
shapes their acceptance of electoral targeting, and that clientelistic offers are more
likely to resonate with low-knowledge voters.
We bring empirical evidence from a vignette experiment conducted in Bulgaria on a
nationally representative sample of 1155 citizens in the aftermath of the 2019 local
elections. In the experiment, the respondents were presented with scenarios where
local politicians targeted them with different types of clientelistic and programmatic
inducements. Survey experiments are particularly well suited to test voter responses
to these kinds of sensitive questions because they avoid the social desirability bias
that often complicates the analysis of standard survey responses.4 Bulgaria is the
appropriate setting for our study because clientelism plays a relevant and long-
lasting role in local governance and elections (see the Research Design section).
This article contributes to the literatures on political behaviour and on electoral cli-
entelism. Our results broaden the understanding about how democratic dissatisfaction
and political knowledge can influence voters’ behaviour beyond political participation. It
is the first attempt to analyse the effects on citizens’ acceptance of clientelism and pro-
grammatic inducements. The dissatisfaction with representative democracy is high
throughout the world5 and this attitude has been traditionally linked with the propensity
(not) to participate in politics. Political knowledge is another central individual level cog-
nitive characteristic that has been often linked with political participation.We show that
the two variables have far-reaching impact on citizens. We also contribute to the emer-
ging literature challenging the assumptions about voters as passive targets of cliente-
lism.6 Earlier studies show that voters’ perceptions on clientelism are mediated by
their socio-economic resources or access to information.7 Our analysis shows how cog-
nitive traits impact the acceptance of clientelismwhen socio-economic variables are con-
trolled for. Finally, the new literature on the “demand side of clientelism” has mainly
focused on voters’ responses to positive inducements, such as vote buying. Consistent
with earlier works, we distinguish theoretically and empirically between positive and
negative types of clientelism and show that voters react to these offers in different ways.8
The next section reviews the literature on electoral clientelism and programmatic
politics. It formulates four sets of testable hypotheses that correspond to general and
specific dissatisfaction and knowledge. We present next the research design with
emphasis on the data, variables and methods. The fourth section interprets the main
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findings of our analysis. The conclusions discuss the main implications of our results
and elaborate on directions for further research.
Electoral clientelism and programmatic politics
Party system theories distinguish between two types of linkages between politicians
and voters. Types of “affective psychological attachments” include linkages based on
party identification, descriptive representation (e.g. based on gender or ethnicity)
and “charismatic” linkages. In contrast, programmatic politics and clientelism are
both “rational and deliberative” modes of political linkage between the politicians
and voters.9 In positive clientelistic exchanges, voters are offered various benefits in
return to their vote: goods, money, preferential access to jobs or welfare services.10
Negative clientelism is based on a punishment for voting the “wrong” way, reflected
in threats to lose the job or the access to welfare benefits.11 Programmatic politics is
defined as the process of mobilizing social and/or electoral support on the basis of a
set of proposed policies and we contrast it with clientelism because of its form and
goals. On the one hand, programmatic politics articulates a plan for achieving mid-
to long-term goals, which is available for the public to consider and used by voters
to hold elected officials accountable. On the other hand, positive and negative cliente-
lism are means with short-term effects, used for the mobilization of individual voters
without any broader goals beyond securing the election of the respective candidate.
These three forms differ in several other ways. The following lines outline the core fea-
tures of these forms along three analytical dimensions: the universalism of the trans-
action, utility for voters and cognitive capacity required (Table 1).
Electoral clientelism and programmatic politics differ in their mode of distribution
and the degree of universalism of the exchanges.12 Both clientelism and programmatic
politics are based on transactions between politicians and voters, where politicians
promise voters some kinds of goods in return for their support. In programmatic poli-
tics, the benefits are distributed universally by publicly available criteria.13 However, the
benefits delivered by programmatic politics can be uncertain and depend on the poli-
ticians’ ability and capacity to deliver them (as well as the politicians’ willingness to
commit to electoral promises in the first place). Therefore, programmatic politics has
sometimes been characterized as a relatively low-expected benefits kind of activity.14
In positive forms of clientelism benefits are distributed on a particularistic and quid
pro quo manner.15 Negative clientelism, too, is based on particularistic exchanges as
voters are threatened with a punishment that is contingent on voting behaviour.16
Both positive and negative clientelistic offers are typically mediated by brokers, i.e.
intermediaries who coordinate clientelistic politics at the local level.17 Both vote
buying and voter coercion are illegal in most electoral codes in the world.
The three types of exchanges differ with respect to the degree of utility provided to
the voter.18 Positive forms of clientelism and programmatic politics are both
Table 1. Differences between electoral exchanges.
Universalism Utility for voters Cognitive capacity required
Positive clientelism Low High Low
Negative clientelism Low Low Low
Programmatic politics High Intermediate High
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transactional modes of exchanges, and they both increase the utility of the voter –
voters get something in return for their vote. In both cases, the personal situation
improves because of their decision. While in the case of programmatic politics an indi-
vidual voter obtains something as a result of the implemented policies of the elected
official, in positive clientelism they obtain it because of a personal agreement. In con-
trast, negative clientelism is based on threatening the voter with some kind of a sanc-
tion if they do not vote in a particular way, and thus does not increase the utility of the
voter.19 This is because in negative clientelism the promise is not to improve voters’
situation, but rather to keep the status quo in return for their vote.
These three types of electoral exchanges differ in the degree of cognitive capacity
required to understand the mechanisms of the exchange. Positive forms of clientelism
present the voters with a rather simple electoral transaction – receiving some kinds of
goods in return of their vote. In such circumstances, the voters have the freedom to
assess whether the thing that is being offered to them is of their personal benefit and
the extent this is the case. More importantly, they have the freedom to choose whether
to accept the offer or not without any significant repercussions for themselves. This
stays in contrast to negative clientelism. It is based on explicit threats and the mechanism
of the exchange is easy to understand. Here, the voter assesses the value of the particular
utility they have and that is under threat of losing. Hence, in contrast to positive cliente-
lism they have less freedom in their choice, given that should they reject the offer, there
will be noticeable effects on their personal situation. In contrast, programmatic politics is
much more complex, and requires a lot of knowledge and informational resources to
understand.20 This particularly concerns the voter’s analysis on the feasibility of the pro-
posed programme, its potential effects on them, as well as on assessment on the potential
of the elected party to implement their programme, for example. In such situation and in
contrast to the cognitive choices in clientelist exchanges, their choice in programmatic
exchanges depends not only on analysis of the outcomes from the direct interaction
between them as a voter and the party that makes the offer, but also on their analysis
of the external circumstances that underpin the offer.
Based on these distinctions we form a set of testable hypotheses on how two central
cognitive characteristics of voters, democratic satisfaction and political knowledge,
shape voters’ acceptance of these different scenarios.
Democratic dissatisfaction and institutional performance
Earlier research indicates that citizens develop different attitudes towards the political
system and specific political institutions.21 These rest on different principles that we
argue can influence the acceptance of clientelism. Satisfaction with the performance
of democracy refers to voters’ evaluations on how well the democratic institutions
are functioning in a given country and falls somewhere between Easton’s diffuse
and specific support for democracy.22 The gap between the democratic expectations
of citizens and their judgements on how well the democratic system functions is
wide in new democracies.23 Voters’ level of democratic satisfaction can influence
their acceptance of different types of electoral targeting for several reasons.
Democratic dissatisfaction has widely been associated with the rise of populism and
anti-establishment voting in many of the world’s democracies.24 Dissatisfaction with
democracy is likely to have other consequences for democratic governance. As
stated previously, both positive and negative forms of clientelism are illegal in most
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electoral codes of the world, and citizens are also aware of their illegal nature. Demo-
cratic satisfaction has also shown to increase citizens’ likelihood to obey the law and
comply with other governmental processes, such as pay taxes.25 In contrast, citizens
are considered more likely to engage in illegal civic acts if their confidence in the demo-
cratic system is very low.26 Along the lines of these arguments, we expect that citizens
who are very dissatisfied with the way democracy functions are more likely to accept
both positive and negative forms of electoral strategies.
At the same time, we expect that voters who are highly skeptical about democracy’s
performance to be less responsive to programmatic policy messages. Democratic dis-
satisfaction has long been associated with the tendency to turn away from politics.
Negative evaluations about democratic governance have been associated with the pro-
pensity not to turn out in elections and not to engage in political life.27 Similarly, pro-
grammatic politics has a limited power to mobilize dissatisfied voters into accepting
such practices. Following these arguments in the literature, we expect that citizens
who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are:
H1a: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on positive clientelistic inducements
H1b: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on negative clientelistic inducements
H1c: Less likely to accept electoral strategies based on programmatic policy inducements
Local government bodies are responsible for many important day-to-day services pro-
vided to citizens. Many new democracies suffer from poor service delivery, which is the
failure of the government to provide basic services for their citizens.28 Access to essen-
tial services, such as welfare services, can be highly stratified in many countries and
these situations have been particularly prone to clientelistic deals.29
Voters’ perception on the workings of local politicians is likely to also affect their
assessment of positive and negative forms of clientelism. Voters’ confidence in the
integrity of public officials influences their likelihood to commit illegal acts such as
tax evasion.30 Therefore, we could also expect that voters who are highly suspicious
of the performance of the local politicians would be more likely to accept both positive
and negative forms of electoral corruption. These arguments indicate that voters who
are dissatisfied with the local government would prefer the particularistic benefits
associated with clientelistic rewards. This preference comes at the expense of uncertain
policy promises. They are skeptical regarding the ability of local politicians to deliver
the programmatic promises once they get into office. These voters distrust local poli-
ticians, are critical towards them and less likely to accept their promises. We therefore
hypothesize that voters who are dissatisfied with the performance of the local govern-
ment are:
H2a: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on positive clientelistic inducements
H2b: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on negative clientelistic inducements
H2c: Less likely to accept electoral strategies based on programmatic policy inducements
General and specific political knowledge
Participation in modern political life requires extensive knowledge and information.31
Voters’ levels of political knowledge varies greatly and has an impact on their political
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behaviour.32 Low levels of political knowledge make voters more susceptible to popu-
list and anti-establishment politicians.33 We argue that citizens’ level of political
knowledge may also have an effect on their acceptance of different types of electoral
exchanges. This happens due to the degree of cognitive complexity required to under-
stand the mechanisms involved. Positive clientelism present voters with a simple elec-
toral transaction: they receive goods in return of their vote. These offers would be
especially attractive for low-knowledge voters who have little information about
how the political system works. Voters’ acceptance of clientelistic offers is also likely
to be shaped by voters’ understanding about the broader consequences of those trans-
actions.34 High-knowledge voters focus more on public consequences of politics
whereas those with lower levels of political knowledge tend to be more myopic in
their political judgements.35 Providing particular clientelistic goods to a select group
of voters often involves negative externalities for the rest of the voters such as steering
resources away from public goods.36 Voters judge clientelism more severely when they
receive information about the negative externalities involved.37
When referring to negative clientelism, the immediate implications of voter coercion
are explicit also to uninformed voters. However, political knowledge increases voters’
sense of political competence and political efficacy.38 Better informed voters are
likely to be more aware of their democratic rights and to condemn voter coercion. Con-
versely, less knowledgeable voters could be expected to be less critical of this practice.
Voters’ level of political knowledge is also likely to shape their acceptance of pro-
grammatic policy offers by politicians. Understanding programmatic politics requires
information about how the political system works and political sophistication affects
voters’ judgements about the behaviour of politicians.39 More knowledgeable voters
are more sympathetic towards the efforts of politicians, while low-knowledge voters
are more prone to expect politicians to act in bad faith.40 Politically informed voters
are inclined to accept programmatic political strategies. Conversely, politically ignor-
ant voters may be more suspicious towards policy promises. We expect that voters with
low levels of political knowledge to be:
H3a: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on positive clientelistic inducements
H3b: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on negative clientelistic inducements
H3c: Less likely to accept electoral strategies based on programmatic policy inducements
Voters with low levels of knowledge are less able to integrate new political information
into an existing political framework.41 During campaigns, political actors – parties and
candidates – present different issues, set the policy agenda or denigrate their
opponents.42 A thorough understanding of these messages is usually achieved when
voters have intimate knowledge about what political actors do and who they are. On
the supply side, political parties with local leaders who have notoriety use clientelism
more compared to parties with leaders who are not known to voters.43 Following the
same logic on the demand side, we expect that voters’ specific knowledge such as the
profile of party candidates to impact on how they respond to clientelistic electoral tar-
geting. Voters who have little information about the track-records and policy profiles
of different candidates would prefer the discretionary payoffs provided by positive cli-
entelistic inducements and therefore accept such practices to a greater extent.
Positive and negative forms of clientelism do not differ markedly in terms of the
cognitive capacity required to understand the proposed exchange. Yet, voters who
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know the local candidates better are also more likely to be aware of various opportu-
nities of political participation. They could be more critical towards voter intimidation.
This is because knowing the local candidates gives these voters sufficient information
and idea about how widespread such behaviour is among candidates. If they are aware
that other candidates do not engage in such conduct, they would be less likely to find it
acceptable and more likely to be motivated to punish it on the ballot box. Conversely,
low-knowledge voters could condemn this practice to a less extent and accept it more.
A reason for this is that their lack of knowledge does not give them a proper under-
standing on whether such behaviour is typical for the candidate or actually is part
of the wider political culture of their place. More importantly, not knowing the candi-
date would make it harder for a voter to identify who is the person on whose behalf
negative clientelism is conducted. It is thus challenging for the voters to punish at
the polls such a behaviour.
The assessment of programmatic policy offers requires extensive information. Voters
who are more knowledgeable about specific political candidates are likely to be more
engaged in politics in general and should have a more positive outlook on the pursuits
of the politicians.44 Political actors seek to develop a consistent issue profile during elec-
toral campaigns45 that can be best achieved if voters pay attention to this profile. We
expect that voters who exhibit specific knowledge about political parties to be more
responsive to programmatic policy offers. Low-knowledge voters are more likely to be
more suspicious of the campaign messages by politicians. In brief, we hypothesize that
citizens who have low levels of knowledge of the top party candidates are:
H4a: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on positive clientelistic inducements
H4b: More likely to accept electoral strategies based on negative clientelistic inducements
H4c: Less likely to accept programmatic electoral strategies by politicians
Research Design
To test these effects, we rely on an original vignette experiment conducted in the after-
math of the Bulgarian local elections (October-November 2019). Bulgaria is the appro-
priate setting for our study because clientelism plays a relevant and long-lasting role in
local governance and elections (see the following section). Clientelism is part of a
broader strategy of negative campaigning in which many Bulgarian political parties,
although they use clientelism, accuse their opponents of doing that. Equally important,
the country has several issues with the rule of law and the quality of democracy, which
makes it a fertile soil for theproliferationof clientelismandcitizens’broaddissatisfaction.
The vignette experiment uses a nationally representative sample of 1155 Bulgarian
citizens and was fielded in two waves with a roughly equal number of respondents:
December 2019–January 2020 and March–April 2020. We use a vignette to measure
our dependent variables. All respondents were informed that they would see a descrip-
tion of a mayoral candidate running in the next Bulgarian local elections. The sample
was divided in three sub-samples that were exposed to different incentives to vote pro-
vided by candidates for the mayoral elections. For positive clientelism we use the state-
ments “The candidate gives you a bag of products, food or money to vote for them”
and “The candidate offers preferential access to welfare benefits after the elections if
you vote for them”.46
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While we are aware that voters may be motivated differently by types of incentives
(bag of products, food or money), we merged them in the same question to accurately
reflect the Bulgarian context. The existing practices of clientelism, especially in smaller
places, traditionally involve parties providing voters with packages that usually
combine food, small items, and a small amount of money. These come together
with a party flyer indicating which candidate the voter should support. In more
recent times we observe that money is potentially handed over separately from bags
of food and products, but the principle remains the same and Bulgarian voters can
rarely differentiate whether they will receive an financial or material incentive to vote.
For negative clientelism the respondents see the statement “The candidate threatens
you with the loss of access to welfare benefits if you do not vote for them”. For pro-
grammatic policies we used two statements referring to candidates’ promises to
focus on policies that are very or moderately important to the voter.47 After seeing
one of these scenarios, the respondents were asked “How acceptable do you find
this politician’s conduct?”. The answers were recorded on a 11-point ordinal scale
that ranges between not at all (0) and very much (10). The results of the ANOVA
test indicate the existence of a statistically significant difference (at the 0.01 level)
between the means of acceptance for each of the three groups of respondents: positive
clientelism, negative clientelism and programmatic policies.
The measurement of the independent and control variables is presented in Appen-
dix 1. We briefly discuss here two variables that are less straightforward. First, we
measure general knowledge (H3) through the subjective or perceived assessment of
individual knowledge. This perception does not always correspond to the real or objec-
tive knowledge, being sometimes overestimated (Dunning-Kruger effect) or in other
instances underestimated (impostor syndrome). However, the imbalance between
actual and perceived knowledge is rarely large because the subjective knowledge can
result from familiarity with a topic.48 Second, media exposure is a cumulative index
of frequency with which respondents watch, listen or read news on TV, radio, news-
papers or online news portals (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.72). All “do not know / no
answer” options were removed from the analysis. Appendix 3 presents the descriptive
statistics for all variables included in the analysis.
We use OLS regression with robust standard errors. Our dependent variable is
measured on a Likert scale with 11 values, and we should ideally use ordinal logistic
regression. However, the assumption of proportional odds is violated – the Brant
Test of Parallel Regression Assumption shows significance at the 0.01 level for all vari-
ables – and we could use only a generalized ordered logistic model. This is quite
difficult to interpret and present and that is why we replace it with an OLS regression.
The latter provides similar and allows for a more straightforward presentation and
interpretation of results. The test for multi-collinearity shows that the independent
variables are not highly correlated, i.e. the VIF values are lower than 1.24.
Clientelism and local elections in Bulgaria: An Overview
Clientelism has a significant place in Bulgarian local politics. Following the introduc-
tion of local self-governance in 1998, the country is divided into 28 provinces (oblasti)
and 265 municipalities (obshtini). While the provincial administration is appointed by
the national government, every four years there are elections for municipal mayor and
city council. The past three decades revealed the close relations between clientelism
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and some of the main characteristics of Bulgarian local government. Three of them
deserve particular attention. First, clientelism affects significantly the job policies of
the local administration. Reports dating back to the first post-communist decade49
highlight the regular practice of hiring “reliable” cadres in key positions in the local
administration or municipal public services by the local governing party, as well as
their protection once the local governing party is out of power. Such practices are
important given the significance of local governments as an employer. In 12 of the
28 provinces the local government is among the top five employers,50 suggesting
that clientelism affects a significant portion of people in the communities across Bul-
garia. Consistent with these observations, more recent studies provide evidence of both
negative and positive types of clientelistic targeting in Bulgaria.51
Second, clientelism is reflected in local public procurement. The privatization of
public services in post-communist Bulgaria allowed for the establishment of public-
private partnerships, where a public service is assigned to a private provider.
Reports on corruption in local public procurement show a close relationship
between local businesses and the local party in government, where businesses would
fund the electoral campaigns of political parties in exchange for procurement contracts
for business owners affiliated to the party in local government.52 Such practices became
particularly widespread especially after the EU accession in 2007 that granted pro-
vinces and municipalities access to EU regional development funding.53 For
example, shortly before the 2019 European Parliament elections a journalist investi-
gation revealed that EU funding, earmarked for rural tourism, has been used to
build private villas for politicians from the governing center-right Citizens for Euro-
pean Development of Bulgaria (GERB).54 Generally, such clientelist practices remain
well-known either for the low quality of the provided service or for the development
of white elephant projects, such as the building of modern football stadiums in
places with no football teams.55
Third, beyond clientelism in local government, local elections are another major
arena for clientelistic practices. The most common of those is vote buying. Recent
years suggest that it grows in scope and relevance at local elections. For example, a
recent survey showed that almost a third of respondents knew personally about
cases of vote buying.56 Furthermore, vote-buying is intensive among groups with an
ethnic minority background (the Roma, in particular) and/or of lower economic
status.57 These practices can influence the electoral outcome. For example, a survey
by Gallup International for the 2015 local elections showed that in places with a
close race for the mayoral position, there has been a significant rise in turnout
among Roma voters.58
The 2019 local elections were particularly illustrative for clientelist practices. Held
just a few months after the elections for the European Parliament, also marked by
rampant levels of vote-buying especially in rural and/or impoverished areas of Bul-
garia,59 the local elections saw the extension of the competition between GERB and
its main political opponents on the left and right. In 2015, GERB won the mayor
office in almost every major city.60 In 2019, the party had to defend its gains and
overall local government record. The campaign in the major cities was heated, with
the liberal right opposition highlighting several clientelistic practices, demanding for
a more transparent and accountable local government. For example, in a television
debate, the main liberal right candidate for Sofia mayor Borislav Ignatov highlighted
“corruption in all its forms” as the main issue of the city, citing examples from
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minor corruption in the municipal administration to major irregularities of public
procurement procedures.61 The main opposition party, the center-left Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP), aimed to use the local elections to criticize GERB’s governing
style, arguing that these clientelistic practices in local government are the essence of
GERB’s governance, calling to vote them out of power.
Dissatisfaction and Poor Knowledge
Figure 1 presents the distribution of acceptance for positive and negative clientelism,
and programmatic policies among the Bulgarian electorate. The horizontal axis dis-
plays the degree of acceptance. There are three straightforward conclusions. First, pro-
grammatic policies are accepted to a considerably higher level than any form of
clientelism. The modal value for acceptance of programmatic activities is the middle
of the scale, with the majority of opinions to the right side of the modal category.
Overall, many voters find programmatic policies quite acceptable. This indicates
that while clientelism is strongly rooted in Bulgarian local politics, voters are not par-
ticularly fond of these practices. It shows that clientelism is not necessarily a part of the
Bulgarian political culture.
Second, Bulgarians accept more the positive than the negative version of cliente-
lism. There is a very strong opposition – three out of five voters – to coercion practices
used to persuade citizens to cast their vote. In comparison, only one in three Bulgarians
considers completely unacceptable the offering of money, food or welfare benefits in
exchange for votes. These results confirm that clientelism can be accepted if it provides
(positive) personal benefits to the respondent. As seen in the background information
about the case, the most common clientelistic practices in Bulgarian local politics rely
to a certain degree on reciprocal benefits, thus creating the impression of being a fair
exchange between equal parties.
Figure 1. The acceptance of clientelism and programmatic policies among Bulgarians.
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We run two different models for each form of clientelism and programmatic pol-
icies. The results of the model without controls are shown in Figure 2. There is empiri-
cal support for some of the hypothesized effects, but the reality appears to be
considerably more nuanced than what expected in theory. The marginal effects indi-
cate that dissatisfaction with democracy is a strong predictor for the acceptance of elec-
toral strategies based on positive clientelistic inducements. This is in line with the
theoretical expectations and evidence indicates that dissatisfaction with democracy
favours also the acceptance of negative clientelism and programmatic policies. In
fact, the effect on voter coercion is the strongest among the four main effects. One
possible explanation for this is apathy. Clientelism in Bulgarian local politics goes
back at least two decades. The absence of a decisive policy addressing it seems to
have taken root among Bulgarian voters into accepting even vote coercion as a
common practice.
Dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy works in Bulgaria increases the
acceptance of programmatic policies. One possible explanation is related to the
desire to improve the quality of democracy in the country. While Bulgarian voters
may be apathetic by accepting even vote coercion as a standard electoral practice,
this does not mean that they remain passive. This data seems to confirm that as Bul-
garian voters are indeed interested in alternatives that ensure better accountability of
local government. For example, in the 2019 local elections in the capital city of Sofia,
Boris Bonev got 11% of the votes based on a comprehensive programme that builds
upon the policy proposals and local government watchdog work of Save Sofia, an
NGO that he chairs.
We also find empirical support for the theoretical expectation according to which
Bulgarian voters who are dissatisfied with the way in which the local government
Figure 2. The effects of satisfaction and knowledge on acceptance.
Note: The regression coefficients are available in Appendix 2.
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does its job are more likely to accept positive clientelism. This is the strongest predictor
for the acceptance of positive clientelism including the controls (Model 2 in Appendix
2). Contrary to our expectations, we find a similar effect on the acceptance of program-
matic policies. This happens because Bulgarian voters remain open towards candidates
who promise to improve their local community by providing a clear plan for local gov-
ernance and ensure an improved accountability. For example, during the campaign for
the 2019 local elections almost two thirds of the voters indicated that even if they are
disillusioned with the incumbent mayor, they would vote based on their preferences
and values rather than automatically supporting any of the challengers.62
The evidence shows no effect of the dissatisfaction with how the local government
works on negative clientelism. One explanation for the statistical independence is that
to Bulgarian voters negative clientelism remains a widespread practice that any party
with realistic chance of gaining or keeping power in local government would use.
Under such circumstances, Bulgarian voters take the rather rational view that the gov-
ernment performance depends on factors other than the reasons people were hired or
fired in the local administration.
Figure 3 compares and contrasts the effects of the two forms of satisfaction – with
democracy and with the government – on the three types of inducements. Although
these two forms of satisfaction are not highly correlated, their effect on the acceptance
of positive clientelism and programmatic policies is very similar. The main difference
lies in the fact that for programmatic policies the effect takes place at a higher level of
acceptance. The figure confirms the earlier interpretation according to which the
acceptance of negative clientelism is driven only by one form of satisfaction, i.e.
with democracy.
Returning to the marginal effects presented in Figure 2, the evidence confirms our
theoretical expectation according to which respondents with low levels of knowledge
Figure 3. The effects of the two forms of satisfaction on acceptance.
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about local politics are likely to accept electoral strategies based on positive clientelistic
inducements. In the Bulgarian case, this matches the reality given the deteriorating
state of the local media. Several reports reveal that Bulgarian regional and local
media increasingly rely on local government funding through PR contracts as a sub-
stitute for independent funding.63 They fail to serve their public functions of scrutiniz-
ing the local government under the threat of losing their funding, prompting them to
avoid reporting on such clientelist practices. This prevents Bulgarian voters from
gaining a proper understanding on the direct effects of clientelism in their local
community.
The findings also illustrate that respondents with low levels of political knowledge
are also inclined to easier accept programmatic policies. In Bulgaria, this is because of
the weak communication skills of independent experts. Recent years saw the increasing
scrutiny of the local candidates’ political programmes, but such discussions remained
rather technical and incomprehensive for the wider public. In such circumstances,
people with limited political knowledge are unable to properly assess the candidates’
proposed programme, prompting them to be more open towards any candidate that
tries to draw support on a programmatic basis if not through any other means.
Equally important, our results indicate that Bulgarian voters who possess knowl-
edge about local politics are more inclined to accept negative clientelism. One possible
explanation for this is their awareness and acceptance that such practice is used in the
local governance of their own community, given its widespread character in Bulgarian
local politics. This prompts such voters to perceive negative clientelism as a legitimate
approach towards mobilizing support.
The specific knowledge of top candidates in Bulgarian elections produces the same
effects on the acceptance for clientelism and programmatic policies. Citizens who have
limited knowledge are more likely to accept positive inducements, as hypothesized
(H2b). A similar effect in terms of size and direction is observed in relation to coercive
clientelism. For acceptance of programmatic policies, the effect is even stronger: the
less people know about candidates, the more likely they are to accept such policies.
These results confirm the ambiguous state in which many Bulgarian voters find them-
selves. Without knowing the candidate, voters tend to return to their own perceptions
on what constitutes a legitimate electoral practice, thus being particularly open towards
programmatic offers, but also towards clientelist practices, given how widespread they
are in Bulgarian local politics.
Among the controls, income is the variable with the highest explanatory power. The
findings indicate that poorer people are more likely to accept both forms of clientelism
and richer Bulgarians are more inclined to accept the programmatic policies. This
confirms earlier findings in the literature64 and recent journalistic reports on cliente-
listic practices in Bulgaria. These reports show a combination of a political apathy and
pragmatism among poorer voters. The latter have the perception that their vote would
not improve their lives so they are willing to engage in clientelistic practices as a means
of personal benefit and/or perseverance.65 In contrast, wealthier voters are not particu-
larly fond of clientelism, preferring to support a programme that aligns with their own
interests and views about the development of their community.
People who do not use media on a regular basis are more inclined to accept both
clientelism and programmatic policies, with a stronger effect on the latter, which
seems to confirm the effects of the deteriorating state of regional and local media in
Bulgaria and its limited abilities to scrutinize local governments. Gender is a strong
DEMOCRATIZATION 13
predictor for negative clientelism with men accepting it to a much higher extent than
women. One potential reason for this is the rather conservative and patriarchal nature
of Bulgarian society,66 in which vote coercion is seen as a legitimate way to exhort
authority. For similar reasons, education does not appear to play a role in the accep-
tance of these electoral practices.
Conclusions
An emerging line of research has begun to focus on the demand side of electoral cli-
entelism. This article contributes to this literature by explaining the acceptance of elec-
toral clientelism and programmatic policy offers. To our knowledge, it is the first study
exploring the role of democratic satisfaction and political knowledge in shaping the
acceptance of different types of electoral inducements. We examine this with the
help of a vignette experiment embedded in a survey conducted in Bulgaria after the
2019 local elections. Our results show that voters who are not satisfied with the way
democracy and democratic institutions function in Bulgaria are more likely to
accept positive clientelistic electoral offers. Voters who have little general political
knowledge are also more likely to accept positive clientelistic targeting. Our findings
regarding the acceptance of voter coercion are more mixed and less robust. In contrast
to our expectations, democratically satisfied voters and high-knowledge voters are also
more likely to accept programmatic policy offers.
Our results on the acceptance of positive types of clientelism shed light on one of
the central puzzles of clientelism research. We can better understand why clientelism
is still widely used despite the known commitment problems undermining its
efficacy.67 We illustrate that the cognitive heterogeneity between the voters may
explain the effectiveness of electoral clientelism even when it is not monitored. Clien-
telistic offers resonate with voters who are very dissatisfied with democratic perform-
ance and who possess little knowledge on politics. All these indicate that some voters
may be so disappointed with “traditional politics” that they are willing to vote for cli-
entelistic politicians hoping to get something in return for their vote. Clientelistic
exchanges could thus in some cases function as a means of “protest voting” for
highly dissatisfied citizens.
We highlight how general levels of democratic dissatisfaction and political knowl-
edge may contribute to the formation of attitudes that partially undermine the logic of
representation. This has important policy implications especially in new democracies
where the politics of representation is often problematic. When voters accept the infor-
mal motivations provided by the electoral competition, the political competition and
representation in general is biased. Dissatisfied citizens accepting the use of clientelism
may encourage political parties and politicians to invest resources in such practices
rather than performing well in office or promoting policies.
Although limited to one country, our analysis provides several relevant insights
about the public acceptance of clientelism. Further research can build on these
grounds and can, for example, analyse the extent to which the acceptance of clientelism
is translated into votes for parties using such practices. Attitudes and voting behaviour
are sometimes correlated, and it is important to see whether this also happens in the
presence of clientelism. Another avenue for research could distinguish clientelist
actions between incumbent and challenger politicians, or by looking closely into the
citizens’ working environment (public vs private), prior experiences of clientelism,
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or personal knowledge about clientelistic practices. On a broader level, we may need to
investigate the relation between political apathy and passivity. Existing literature tends
to view the two as similar, but the evidence in this article clearly shows that being apa-
thetic and cynical about politics does not necessarily mean that one is passive and does
not seek to reignite their political participation. More work needs to be done also on
the relation between non-participation and the values and views that underpin it.
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Appendix 1. Variable measurement codebook
Variable Question Coding
Positive clientelism / negative
clientelism / programmatic
policies
How acceptable do you find this politician’s
conduct? If he/she gives you a bag of
products, food or money; offers preferential
access to welfare benefits after the elections
to vote for them; threatens you with the loss
of access to welfare benefits if you do not
vote for them; the candidate will improve
the state of the local roads; the candidate
will improve the state of the local schools
and health care
Not at all (0)
Very much (10)
Satisfaction with democracy How satisfied are you with the way democracy
works in Bulgaria?




How satisfied are you with the way the local
government (of your community) does its
job?
General knowledge How would you rate your knowledge about




Specific knowledge How well did you know the top candidates of
these parties from your locality before the
electoral campaign for the local elections?






Media exposure How often watch, listen or read news on TV,
radio, newspapers or online news portals
Seldom / Never (1), daily or
almost daily (4)
Gender What is your gender? male (1), female (2)




Income What is the total yearly net income in your
household?
o-4,000 Лв (roughly
€2000) (1), over 100,000
Лв (7)
Appendix 2. The results of the OLS regression analysis
Positive clientelism Negative clientelism Programmatic policies
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Satisfaction with
democracy




−0.15** (0.19) −0.15** (0.19) −0.02 (0.25) −0.03 (0.26) −0.15** (0.16) −0.15** (0.16)
General political
knowledge
−0.08* (0.18) −0.08* (0.18) 0.03 (0.29) 0.01 (0.27) −0.07 (0.18) −0.04 (0.18)
Specific political
knowledge
−0.08 (0.21) −0.07 (0.20) −0.07 (0.25) −0.01 (0.25) −0.16** (0.16) −0.16** (0.16)
Media exposure −0.04 (0.05) −0.07 (0.08) −0.09* (0.05)
Gender −0.04 (0.28) −0.23** (0.39) 0.04 (0.24)
Education −0.04 (0.11) −0.04 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11)
Income −0.14** (0.09) −0.12* (0.10) 0.08* (0.07)
Constant 9.23 (0.92) 11.01 (1.17) 7.97 (1.28) 11.64 (1.51) 12.19 (0.79) 11.83 (1.12)
R2 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.13
N 464 464 232 232 458 458
Note: Coefficients are standardized (robust standard errors in brackets).
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis
Mean Std. dev Min. Max. N
Acceptance positive clientelism 3.93 (4.10) 3.04 (3.15) 1 11 464
Acceptance negative clientelism 3.07 (3.18) 2.96 (3.12) 1 11 232
Acceptance programmatic politics 6.75 (6.89) 2.61 (2.62) 1 11 458
Satisfaction with democracy 3.34 (3.43) 0.69 (0.68) 1 4 1155
Satisfaction with local government 2.97 (2.96) 0.84 (0.86) 1 4 1155
General political knowledge 2.37 (2.38) 0.79 (0.78) 1 4 1155
Specific political knowledge 2.81 (2.71) 0.76 (0.76) 1 4 1155
Media exposure 8.19 (8.28) 2.57 (2.65) 4 16 1155
Gender 1.60 (1.53) 0.49 (0.500) 1 2 1155
Education 3.44 (3.34) 1.16 (1.12) 1 5 1155
Income 2.95 (2.97) 1.67 (1.63) 1 7 1155
Notes: The survey was conducted in two waves: December 2019–February 2020 (N = 543) and March–April 2020
(N = 612).
The mean and standard deviation are for the entire sample, in brackets for Wave 1.
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